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What is a Judicial Author?
by Peter Friedman'
Martha Woodmansee has pointed out that
the law has yet to be affected by the "critique of authorship" initiated
by Foucault and carried forward in the rich variety of post-structuralist
research that has characterized literary studies during the last two
decades. Indeed, . . . it would seem that as creative production
becomes more corporate, collective, and collaborative, the law invokes
the Romantic author all the more insistently.'
Woodmansee wrote about the conceptions of authorship that legal
institutions bring to bear in deciding copyright-related disputes.2
Nevertheless, the law's ignorance of the "critique of authorship" includes
a willful ignorance of the means of its own production. Inasmuch as
law-particularly Anglo-American common law-constitutes a continual
reinterpretation of its existing texts, this blindness to the collaborative
nature of the production of those texts leads to poor interpretation of

* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Visiting
Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. Brown University (B.A.,
1981); University of Michigan (J.D., 1984). Member, State Bar of New York. The Author
wishes to thank Tamara Millner for her yeoman research and writing efforts in support of
this Article. The Author also wishes to thank Martha Woodmansee, without whose
unflagging support, brilliant writing, insightful teaching, and dear friendship this Article
could never have been conceived. In many ways, Martha is one of the few who can
genuinely claim to have "originated" the ideas underlying its conception. Finally, the
Author would like to thank the Association of Legal Writing Directors, whose scholarship
grant made the initial work on this Article possible.
A version of this Article was originally presented by the Author at Con/texts of Invention:
A Working Conference of the Society for Critical Exchange, held at Case Western Reserve
University in Cleveland, Ohio, on April 20-23, 2006, http-//www.cwru.edu/affil/sce//Contexts of Invention.html.
1. Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 15, 28
(Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
2. See id. at 15-28.
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those texts, misguided law, and a misbegotten approach to traditional
United States legal education.
In short, there is confusion about what it means to say that a judge is
the "author" of a judicial opinion. A judicial opinion is the quintessential
product of a collaborative writing enterprise, as are the written products
of the lawyers who participate as advocates in the enterprise that results
in judicial opinions. At every level of the trial and appellate process, a
judicial opinion is the outcome of the careful consideration of persuasive
arguments posed by the parties' lawyers and contained in judicial
opinions produced in earlier cases.' The collaborative nature of legal
writing is such that no one takes seriously any real notion of copyright
interests in the products of legal writing produced by lawyers and judges
in the course of the judicial process. Literal, unattributed cutting-andpasting, instinctively considered plagiarism in most contexts, is simply
everyday professional practice. In short, collaborative writing communities produce judicial opinions. Those opinions are not the inspired
products of judges who excel as original authors in any traditionally
Romantic sense.
The collaborative nature of judicial opinions is, however, inconsistent
with conventional ways in which both professional and popular opinion
represent judges-as authors in the creative, originating sense.
Individual judges are lionized in a manner inconsistent with their real
accomplishment, and the study of law as "literature" thereby threatens
to engage in a type of misreading that is far more conventionally applied
to poetry or fiction. Moreover, the near universal failure of legal
scholars to explicitly recognize and examine the collaborative nature of
legal writing of all sorts-including, of course, the briefs written by
lawyers that the courts consider before rendering their decisions and
writing their opinions-undermines the ways students are taught to read
legal writing. In other words, the emphasis in United States legal
education on the judicial opinion as the principal-and almost exclusive-subject of study inevitably leads students to read one way: as if
they are reading great literature from which they are meant to derive
wisdom they can later regurgitate at the appropriate time. Instead,
because law students are lawyers-in-training, they should read every
opinion as just the latest voice in a never-ending conversation in which
they themselves are necessary participants.

3. Those earlier opinions, of course, are themselves the product of arguments made by
lawyers to the courts that wrote those earlier opinions, and those lawyers' arguments were
derived from earlier writings by judges and lawyers in even earlier cases. Thus, every
judicial opinion is the product of writings derived, via a process of infinite regress, from
earlier legal writings.
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LEGAL WRITING IS A COLLABORATIVE WRITING ENTERPRISE
CULMINATING IN THE JUDICIAL OPINION

To fully understand the collaborative nature of all legal writing
produced in the course of litigation that culminates in a judicial opinion,
it is necessary first to understand the distinction the common law draws
between judicial judgments on the one hand and the opinions justifying
those judgments on the other. The judgment is the remedy ordered by
the court and applied to the litigants before it.' The opinion, on the
other hand, sets forth the judge's justifications for that remedy under
those facts.' As explained more fully below, this distinction between
judgment and opinion is central to common-law reasoning. Lawyers and
judges know that the court's ordered result and the facts of the case are
of paramount importance in interpreting a judicial opinion. Any
justifications for the result that the court expresses are no more
persuasive merely by virtue of being expressed than are justifications
the court never dreamed of, much less mentioned. Common-law judging
is, most importantly, judicial decision-making; the reasons advanced by
a judge for those decisions-that is, for those results-are at best
secondary, and as far as the prospective functioning of the judicial
enterprise is concerned, they are entirely dispensable.
It is almost a clich6 that judges reach intuitive (albeit contingent)
decisions in cases after considering the evidence but before coming up
with the legal rationalizations for those a priori decisions. To admit as

4. See 12 JAMES W.M. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 58.02[1 (3d ed. 2010);
Glossary, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/common/glossary.aspx (last

visited Jan. 7, 2011).
Judgment, defined in [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 54(a), includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. Judgment thus includes both a final
order, and any interlocutory order that is appealable.... A final order is one that
is meant to dispose of all issues in dispute. For example, a denial of relief "at this
time" is not final and therefore is not appealable, nor is dismissal of a complaint
if the plaintiff may, under proper circumstances, be entitled to replead.
MOORE, supra (footnotes omitted). In the words of the Federal Judiciary Website, a
judgment is "[t]he official decision of a court finally resolving the dispute between the
parties to the lawsuit." Glossary, supra.
5. MOORE, supra note 4, § 58.02[2].

Certain terms in this area are often used imprecisely, which can lead to confusion.
For example, findings of fact and conclusions of law are often referred to as a
"decision" or an "opinion." Such a decision is not a "judgment," but rather a
statement of the reasons supporting the judgment. The judgment itself is
separate from the opinion or memorandum. However, an opinion or memorandum
may clarify the terms of a judgment or the intent of the court issuing an order.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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much is perhaps not as radical and anarchic a notion as some legal
formalists might suggest. Court cases are, after all, disputes between
particular individuals in their own particular circumstances-any
emotionally and intellectually functioning human will inevitably arrive
at a very human judgment regarding a particular dispute between
particular people. Indeed, United States courts only have the power to
decide cases in which there are tangible disputes between individuals
who have direct stakes in the outcome of those disputes.' Moreover,
courts have the option to issue judgments setting forth orders without
providing any justification-that is, any "opinion"-whatsoever.'
Nevertheless, it is unfashionable in the extreme to suggest that judges
reach intuitive decisions about the evidence before them before closely
analyzing the applicable legal rules. The common fear seems to be that
without the a priori restraint imposed on the interpretation of evidence
by immutable rules, judges would rule purely according to subjective,
morally unconstrained emotion. In short, to suggest that judges might
decide cases before articulating compelling reasons to support those
decisions threatens the belief of many that the judge's role is simply to
interpret law, not to make law.
Nevertheless, no one immersed in common-law analysis can argue that
there is a difference between a court's decision and the court's opinion
announcing that decision or that the decision is far more important to
the future development of the law than the opinion. It is fundamental
to a true understanding of the common law that when interpreting a
court's opinion, what a court does matters far more than what it says.
As James Boyd White puts it, "The most important message is the one

6. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. Based on both constitutional and judicially developed
doctrines derived from political concerns and deference to the doctrine of separation of
powers, United States courts only have the power to decide actual cases and controversies.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 15 JAMES W.M. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.01 (3d
ed. 2010). Thus, courts only have the power to rule in cases that are termed "justiciable."

MOORE, supra. Justiciability is a doctrine derived from "the so-called 'private rights' model
of adjudication, which posits that the sole role of the federal judiciary is to adjudicate live
disputes, and any judicial pronouncements of law must come as an incident to performance
of that adjudicatory function." Id.
A court can only rule in situations involving tangible disputes that can be resolved by
means having "a concrete impact on the parties to the dispute." Id. Accordingly, courts
do not have the power to decide purely "political questions," to answer requests for advisory
opinions, to resolve disputes that subsequent events have rendered moot, or to resolve
disputes between persons who have no concrete stake in the outcome of the dispute. Id.
7. See Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Opinion Writingand OpinionReaders, 31
CARDOzO L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) ("[Certain] cases do not merit even a nonprecedential opinion.
Instead, a plain judgment order or citation to the district court opinion in the appendix is
sufficient.").
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the judge performs, not the one he states."' Any lawyer knows that
courts tend to be very good at reaching the right decisions; courts'
abilities to articulate persuasive reasons for those decisions, however,
often leave a lot to be desired.
Because it is the court's decision that matters, and the justification for
that decision may or may not be convincing, common-law lawyers and
judges understand that any persuasive interpretation of that decision is
acceptable, whether articulated in the opinion or not. In fact, the most
persuasive explanations of earlier decisions are often-or even usually-explanations the deciding courts never articulated. One author notes
that
if the legal process is approached as though it were a method of
applying general rules of law to diverse facts-in short, as though the
doctrine of precedent meant that general rules, once properly determined, remained unchanged, and then were applied, albeit imperfectly,
in later cases[,] . . . it would be disturbing to find that the rules change
from case to case and are remade with each case. Yet this change in the
rules is the indispensabledynamic quality of law. It occurs because the

scope of a rule of law, and therefore its meaning, depends upon a
determination of what facts will be considered similar to those present
when the rule was first announced. The finding of similarity or
difference is the key step in the legal process.
The determination of similarity or difference is the function of each
judge. Where case law is considered, and there is no statute, he is not
bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the prior judge even
in the controlling case. The statement is mere dictum, and this means
that the judge in the present case may find irrelevant the existence or
absence of facts which prior judges thought important. It is not what
the prior judge intended that is of any importance; rather it is what the
present judge, attempting to see the law as a fairly consistent whole,
thinks should be the determining classification. In arriving at his
result he will ignore what the past thought important; he will emphasize facts which priorjudges would have thought made no difference.'

Even a staunch opponent of postmodernism such as Richard Posner
admits that the notion "[tihat the judicial decision precedes the judicial
opinion is a more plausible hypothesis" than to suppose that the judge

8. JAMES BOYD WHITE, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of
Life, in HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 107, 117
(1985); see also Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 810, 819 (1961) (stating that opinions "are what courts do, not just what
they say").
9. Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 502
(1948) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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reasons his way through the drafting of his opinion and only then
reaches his conclusion.o Thus, as do the vast majority of lawyers and
judges, Posner accepts that in the process of reaching a decision, there
is a distinction between what a judge does and what a judge writes to
justify what he has done." In addition, lawyers know that although a
judge's decision has precedential force, the judge's opinion is a contingent, partial justification for that decision and that the judge's original
justification can be later reinterpreted or superseded entirely if different
reasoning can support the decision. The judicial decision is treated as
inviolate (within limits, of course); in contrast, the judge's reasoning
lasts only until a better justification is put forward.
Given the distinction lawyers draw between judicial decision-making
and judicial justification-making, judicial decisions-not judicial
reasoning-provide the driving force of the common-law system via the
doctrine of stare decisis. Under stare decisis, the common-law legal
system requires prior decisions to be followed in subsequent cases when
the material facts of those cases are indistinguishable from those in
earlier decisions. 2 It should be plain, therefore, that the interpretation of common-law decisions is a far more contestable matter than
it would be if interpretation of those decisions involved only the
transposition ofjustifications and rationales announced by earlier courts

10. Richard A. Posner, The Law of the Beholder, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 2000, at 49,
52 (reviewing ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000)).

11. See id. at 52. It is not the purpose of this Article to address the criticism that
Posner's distinction between a judge's reasoning and the language the judge employs to
express that reasoning might be inadequate. Posner can reject his conception of
postmodernism and still hold the dangerous belief that "the judicial decision precedes the
judicial opinion" because he distinguishes between the reasoning and the writing processes.
Id. First, he believes that "judges reason to the outcome" and that only after such
reasoning does it come time to put that reasoning into words. Id. (emphasis added). Thus,
"when it comes time to write the opinion explaining and justifying their conclusionis],
[judges] resort to literary devices and cultural cues, either in a conscious effort to make the
opinion more persuasive or in unconscious conformity to the customs and the usages that
define advocacy prose, which is what a judicial opinion is." Id. Posner, it seems, believes
rhetoric is merely the dress reasoning is forced to wear among the hoi polloi. In contrast,
James Boyd White argues that the process of formulating justifications is inseparable from
the process of formulating the language in which those justifications are expressed: "The
judge is always a person deciding a case the story of which can be characterized in a rich
range of ways; and he (or she) is always responsible both for his choice of characterization
and for his decision. He is always responsible . . . for the composition that he makes."
WHITE, supra note 8, at 123 (emphasis omitted).
12. Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts ofAppeals Perish if They Publish? Or
Does the DecliningUse of Opinions to Explain and Justify JudicialDecisionsPose a Greater
Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 770 (1995).
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to new cases."a Again, however, common-law interpretation binds a
court in a new case to follow the results in an earlier case only to the
extent that no persuasive rationale distinguishes the circumstances that
gave rise to the dispute in the new case from circumstances in the
earlier case. In other words, the reasoning of the first case does not
control if the court in the new case identifies facts in that case that in
its judgment do not justify application of the reasoning in the new case.
As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in 1821,
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit
when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim
is obvious. The question actually before the Court is investigated with
care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may
serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case
decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom
completely investigated.14
Thus, even if a literal reading of the earlier court's reasoning would
compel a single conclusion in the later case, the court in the later case
could legitimately reach a different result by means of a rationale that
justified not extending the reasoning of the earlier case to the facts of
the later case. Karl Llewellyn put the point concisely: "Where the
reason stops, there stops the rule."" Failing to follow the result in the
earlier case does not reject its reasoning; it only rejects extending the
reasoning to the new facts.
Conversely, reasoning that supports the result in a case might
subsequently be discredited, but that decision would remain legitimate
if a persuasive alternative justification supports that result on those
facts:
Strictly speaking, the later court is not bound by the statement of
reasons, or dictis, set forth in the rationale. We know this because a
decision may still be vital although the original reasons for supporting

13. Such a mechanical application of comprehensive, specific legal rules is much more
a characteristic (with some exaggeration) of "civil law" systems derived from the Napoleonic
Code (as contrasted with "common law" systems) and is more dominant in the non-AngloAmerican legal world. In pure common-law cases, courts do make an effort to articulate
forward-looking legal rules, and those rules are often useful in future efforts to interpret
and apply those decisions, but those rules are always considered contingent on the facts
to which they have previously been applied and modifiable under materially different facts.
14. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).
15.

KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 158 (7th ed. 1981).
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it may have changed drastically or been proved terribly fallacious. In
a large number of cases, both ancient and modern, one or more of the
reasons given for the decision can be proved to be wrong, but the cases
have retained vitality.16
Thus, a later court may be bound to follow a legitimate rationale
supporting an earlier decision whose result remained valid even if the
reasoning the court had used to support the earlier decision was no
longer accepted. The determination the later court would have to make
is (a) whether the rationale now accepted as conferring legitimacy on the
earlier decision is applicable to the new facts under consideration or (b)
if the facts the court is considering in the new case are so distinguishable from those in the earlier case that the court is not bound by the
reasoning that supports the earlier decision.
In short, it is what a .court does that matters." That deed-the
decision-is binding on subsequent courts as long as that result can be
persuasively justified on any grounds."
Inevitably, therefore, the

16. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't; When Do We Kiss It
and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 605, 607 (1990).

17. WHITE, supra note 8, at 117. The Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, who has served
as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, has expressed this
reasoning in terms of symbolic logic:
The "material implication" formula is the essence of precedent: if antecedent fact
P is present, then legal consequence Q will follow. This is indicated: P Z Q.
Precedent thus is embodied in the following formula:
P Q
R-P
:. R Q
The key to logic and the law is correctly deciding when R is equal to P. If R's
material facts are similar or the same as P's, then the previous case, Pz Q,
controls. The essence of common-law precedent is, therefore, two-fold:
+ The rule or holding of the case has the force of law.
+ The decision constitutes the rule in subsequent cases containing material facts
similar to or identical with those in the case.
Aldisert, supra note 16, at 608 (emphasis added).
18. The tension between narrow and broad interpretations of common-law judicial
precedents is reflected in the perpetual effort of the common-law legal community,
including judges in their opinions, to enunciate comprehensive systems of rules. The mere
existence of these written rules, especially (as discussed more fully below) when combined
with the misapprehension of how a judicial opinion is produced, means that
[iin a legal system built on stare decisis, the law-announcing function of opinions
as precedents ... is the function most emphasized among law students, law
teachers and members of the bar, particularly as they study opinions in an
attempt to ascertain "what the law is". . . [J]ludicial opinions originate the legal
rules, principles, standards, and policies that comprise the main body of society's
law.
Dragich, supra note 12, at 771 (alterations in original).
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meaning of a judicial decision is remarkably contestable; the deciding
court's statements-no matter how unqualified in tone-are always subject
to qualification when applied to different facts.
It is precisely this radical contestability that fuels the enormous
enterprise that is the United States litigation system. Most legal
disputes that proceed far enough to result in any sort of judicial opinion
involve some reasonable interpretation of existing law on the part of the
parties on all sides of those disputes." Those competing interpretations result in a lot of writing that is read, interpreted, and responded
to before a judicial opinion is produced. Suzanne Ehrenberg has
described the process that results in judicial opinions as a collaborative
endeavor involving the advocates and the adjudicator in a series of four
stages." In the first stage, the attorneys articulate arguments for the
judge in the form of written briefs. 2 1 During the second stage, the
judge "absorb[s]" the facts and legal arguments presented in the
attorneys' written briefs (often delegating the principal responsibility for
first doing so to a clerk), allowing the judge (and the clerk) to evaluate
the merits of the arguments.2 2 During the third stage, the judge
produces a written opinion, or the clerk produces an opinion and subjects
it to the judge's scrutiny.23 During the final stage of the appellate
writing process, the opinion is reviewed by other judges and their staffs;
the opinion is scrutinized "for thoroughness, accuracy, and consistency."24

19. In a recent survey of 278 out of 400 federal trial court judges, 70% of the
respondents called "groundless litigation" either a "[simall problem" or a "[viery small
problem," and 15% said it was "Injo problem." David Rauma & Thomas E. Wilging, Report
of a Survey of United States District Judges' Experiences and Views Concerning Rule 11,
FederalRules ofCivil Procedure,FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 2,4 (2005), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rulell05.pdfl$file/rulellO5.pdf. Only 1% called it a "[vlery large
problem," 2% called it a "[large problem," and the rest rated it as a "[mloderate problem"
in their courts. Id. at 4.
It is important also to note that the vast majority of legal disputes in the United States
are resolved without any necessity of a judicial opinion of any sort. More than 98% of civil
lawsuits filed in the United States settle before trial. R. LAWRENCE DESSEM, PRETRIAL
LITIGATION: IN A NUTSHELL 6 (4th ed. 2008). The vast majority of legal disputes do not
even result in a lawsuit. One of the likely preconditions to the rare case resulting in a
written judicial opinion is that the application of the existing law to its facts gives rise to
at least two inconsistent but reasonable interpretations of the law.
20. Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 IoWA L.
REV. 1159, 1191-92 (2004).
21. Id. at 1191.
22. Id. at 1191-92.
23. Id. at 1192.
24. Id.
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At every stage of that writing process, determining an "author" in any
conventional sense would be a difficult task. Each lawyer or set of
lawyers representing each client is likely to have privileged and
confidential interpretations and arguments committed to writing in one
form or another. To determine the effects of applicable precedent, there
is likely to be plenty of description and outright quotation of that
precedent in those writings. In many instances, the principal responsibility for initially drafting such a legal analysis will be relegated to the
most junior lawyer, whose analysis is always subject to the guidance of
The best
more senior lawyers and often to outright rewriting.
arguments for a client's legal position are only produced in writing-in a
brief-to the court when the court needs to decide a matter pertaining to
that position. The author of the brief is as contestable as the author of
any underlying, confidential memoranda might be. It is a clich6 in the
big-firm world that when a brief indicates multiple authors, as often is
the case, the "real" author is the person at the bottom of the list
(typically the most junior lawyer)."
However, it is not simply the collaborative nature of the writing
process in legal practice that makes it difficult to identify the author of
a legal brief. There is no effective legal claim to the rights of a
traditional author in the writing set forth in a brief, and legal practice
reflects as much. Lawyers writing briefs borrow wholesale from
previously produced legal writing. Lawyers literally cut and paste from
other lawyers' briefs without any attribution to the authors of those
briefs. It is, of course, in the interest of lawyers in the same firm to
share writing in this way, but the sources of wholesale borrowing are not
limited to the writing of allies. Briefs are public documents,2 6 and no

25. Law is by no means unique in this regard. A similar collaborative "authorship" is
seen in the world of architecture:
Another reason accusations of plagiarism rarely make it to court is that
architecture, despite the romantic image of the solitary genius, is largely a
collaborative pursuit. Principal, project architect, project designer and outside
consultants of all stripes contribute to a design. All the while, young architects
move from firm to firm, spreading ideas and sometimes eventually opening their
own, competing offices. As for student architects, well, just because they don't get
paid for their work doesn't mean it never enters the commercial arena. "There's
so much rich activity going on at the schools," said Bill Sharples of the Manhattan
firm SHoP/Sharples Holden Pasquarelli, "it's hard not to be influenced by it."
With so many influences and so many echoes, authorship is rarely a simple
question.
Fred A. Bernstein, Hi, Gorgeous. Haven't I Seen You Somewhere?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,

2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/28/arts/design/28bern.html.
26. See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (footnote omitted)
("It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy
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one has ever successfully claimed copyright infringement for unacknowledged use of someone else's legal argument in a writing submitted to or
written by a court.
Nor is there any sanction imposed against lawyers for what would
constitute plagiarism in any other context. Courts are not really
concerned with the origin of the arguments. Courts may be bound to
follow statutes (and earlier court decisions under the doctrine of stare
decisis), but they are not bound at all to any secondary authorities.
Accordingly, the effectiveness of an argument is unlikely to be affected
in any positive way by attributing the argument to a secondary source
that lacks persuasive weight. 27 Therefore, attribution often is of no
practical use to the lawyer and may in fact be counter-productive by
distracting the briefs audience-the judge and clerk-from the main
thrust of the argument. Except in those rare instances where the
"borrowed" material carries persuasive weight simply because of its
author's identity, attribution is not necessary to the production of a
persuasive legal argument. In a brief, as in an opinion, utility as
persuasion is all that matters; thus, attribution is purely a function of
whether the attribution makes the argument more persuasive. If
attribution does not do so, then the attribution is entirely unnecessary.
The judicial opinion itself, which responds to the legal briefs, is clearly
the result of a further set of collaborations on the arguments already
written by the lawyers for the parties. Although judges are permitted
to write opinions in their own style and to express their own personality
to some extent, even a superficial examination of the attributions in a
typical opinion reveals that the opinion is essentially authored by many
individuals and derived from a number of sources-including the
established law, the lawyers' written and spoken legal arguments,
official notes of advisory committees created during the judicial
rulemaking process, and earlier opinions.2 8
Those attributed borrowings sit on top of a large pile of unattributed
borrowings. Anecdotal evidence shows, and further inquiry is likely to
show that, in producing their opinions, judges habitually cut and paste
without attribution from lawyers' briefs as freely as lawyers do in
producing their briefs. I tell my first-year legal writing students

public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.").
27. The vast majority of secondary sources-commentaries on primary law rather than
on the law itself-lack any practical persuasive weight in courts. In a review of Ohio
appellate court opinions, only 4.3% of the citations in the sample were to secondary
sources. James Leonard, An Analysis of Citationsto Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions
Published in 1990, 86 LAw LIBRARY J. 129, 136 (1994).
28. Adrian Vermeule, JudicialHistory, 108 YALE L.J. 1311, 1328 (1999).
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truthfully that I knew I had written the best brief I possibly could on a
motion when the court's opinion announcing its decision was directly cutand-pasted from my brief. Benjamin Cardozo, who is as lionized an
author as any twentieth-century judge, was said to have written one of
the most important New Deal era decisions-the one finding the Social
Security system constitutional-by simply "plagiarizing" the Franklin D.
Roosevelt administration's brief in the case.29
Recently, the unconscious misconception of legal authorship resulted
in a claim that was, given the conventionality of such misconceptions,
inevitable. Lawyers who had won a $145 billion judgment against the
tobacco industry moved for reconsideration en banc of a decision
reversing that judgment on the grounds that a Florida panel of judges
had engaged in "judicial plagiarism" in their opinion announcing the
decision.ao The lawyers alleged that the three-member panel lifted
their opinion from the defendant tobacco companies' own briefs and
somehow thereby violated the plaintiffs' due process rights."1 The
allegation of plagiarism was grounded in the following contention:
"[More than] 86 percent of the panel opinion was authored by the
tobacco industry, representing approximately 59 pages of the 68-page
opinion through an almost verbatim replication of tobacco's appellate
briefs, without a single attribution."" The argument went nowhere.
The appeal was dismissed in a memorandum opinion announcing
merely-without any reference to law, facts, or argument-that the motion
for reconsideration en banc was denied." As conventional as it may be
to believe legal texts have authors who somehow own them, the results
of the legal process quite clearly reject the idea.
Judges are never likely to be found to be "plagiarists" in their judicial
opinions;3 4 they are certainly not able to claim a copyright in the
opinions they issue. To guarantee due process, "Uludicial opinions are

29. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); John Attarian, Is Social Security
Constitutional?,LEWROCKWELL.COM (May 23, 2003), http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig3/at
tarian7.html.
30. Siobhan Morrissey, A Case of Judicial Plagiarism?Plantiffs Object to Court's
Liberal Use of Defense Briefs, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 2003 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id.
32. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, No. 3D00-3400, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 14774, at *1
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2003).
34. But see Jaime S. Dursht, Note, JudicialPlagiarism:It May Be Fair Use but Is It
Ethical?, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1253, 1255 (1996) (arguing that judicial plagiarism is
unethical and proposing that the offense be specifically prohibited by an amendment to the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct).
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the law of the land, and must be made available to the public."" In
Wheaton v. Peters,3 the Supreme Court of the United States established the government works exception and denied copyright protection
to the official reporter of its cases. 37 The Court's decision in Banks v.
Manchester3 8 expanded the ruling in Wheaton by denying copyright
protection for state judicial opinions, explaining that judicial opinions
belong to the people, judges have adequate financial incentives to ensure
creation of opinions, judicial opinions constitute the law, and due process
requires complete access to the law.39 As stated by the Court in Banks,
Judges . . . can themselves have no . .. proprietorship, as against the
public at large, in the fruits of their judicial labors. . . . The question

is one of public policy, and there has always been a judicial consensus,
from the time of the decision in the case of Wheaton v. Peters, that no
copyright could, under the statutes passed by congress, be secured in
the products of the labor done by judicial officers in the discharge of
their judicial duties. The whole work done by the judges constitutes
the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding
every citizen, is free for publication to all.40
Finally, section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976, which statutorily
defines "work of the United States Government," does not permit
copyright protection of "work prepared by an officer or employee of the
United States Government as part of that person's official duties."' 2
Judicial opinions plainly constitute governmental work and thus are
incapable of being copyrighted.4 3
II.

THE Too-CONVENTIONAL VIEW IS THAT THE JUDGE IS AN
"AUTHOR" IN THE CREATIVE AND ORIGINATING SENSE

In short, the only credible characterization of the process that
produces a judicial opinion is that of a collaborative writing enterprise.
Nevertheless, the Romantic view that forms contemporary common

35. Cary E. Donham, Note, Copyright, Compilations, and Public Policy: Lingering
Issues After the West Publishing-MeadData Central Settlement, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375,
384 (1988).
36. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
37. Id. at 668.
38. 128 U.S. 244 (1888).

39. Id. at 253-54.
40. Id. at 253 (citation omitted).
41.

17 U.S.C.

§

101 (2006).

42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Nick Martini, Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 18
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 93, 100 (2003).
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wisdom-that the opinion is the original work of the wise and creative
judge pronouncing from on high-persists even among readers of judicial
opinions. Moreover, the failure to understand a judicial opinion as a
model of Neoclassical craftsmanship has a significant and deleterious
effect on the ways in which opinions are read.
The Romantic view of the judge as a "judicial genius," drawn from
legal literature of nineteenth-century legal professionals, was representative of what has been deemed the "Age of Formalism."' The term
"Romanticism" refers to the nineteenth-century American spiritual
conception of the human mind: "Whereas empirical psychology portrayed
the mind as a passive 'reflector of the external world,"' the contemporary
Romantic view was of "the mind as both 'projective and capable of
receiving back the fused product of what it gives and what is given to
it.""' The Romantics viewed perception as a creative process: "the
perceiving mind recreated the world as it came in contact with it,
assimilating and synthesizing its disparate elements into a new
whole.""
Analysis of legal discourse between 1800 and 1930 reveals a corresponding emergence of judicial thinkers whose insights were conceived
to be both spontaneous, sui generis products of their own minds and
legitimate expressions of the politically sanctioned rule of law.47 In
contrast to "[aintebellum judicial biographers [who] tended to depict the
judge as a neoclassical artisan, whose legal constructions were made
from given precedents, . . . [the] new judicial ideal [was] . . . a romantic
author who left his unique imprint on the law."" The judge was an
artist, celebrated "as an 'original genius' whose work was a spontaneous
production emanating from his own mind under the impulse of
The Romantic judge "was considered 'distinctly and
feeling."'
personally responsible for his creation"' and was "guided [only] by laws
of his own origination."so In 1831 Joseph Story wrote of Chief Justice
Parker, "[I]t is difficult to combine so many valuable qualities in a single
character . . . as a judge, he was eminent for sagacity, acuteness,
wisdom, impartiality, and dignity; as a citizen, for public spirit, and
elevated consistency of conduct; as a man, for generosity, gentleness, and

44.

(1998)
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Susanna L. Blumenthal, Law and the Creative Mind, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 151, 154

(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 157-58.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id. at 165.
Id.
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moral purity."" This depiction "of the [18311 judge also mirrors liberal
theologians' characterizations of God in the nineteenth century,"
symbolizing the elevated god-like status to which judges were ascending.5 2 For example, pre-Civil War judges were considered god-like in
their profound understanding of human nature and their possession of
impartiality, benevolence, sagacity, and artless simplicity.5 3
The characterization of the judge as a "genius" suggests that the
success of Romanticism extended well into nineteenth-century American
While Neoclassicism reveled in the collaborative
legal culture."
enterprise as a means of personal identity, Romanticism focused more
The
on individualistic qualities in describing personal identity."
evolution of the meaning of the word "genius" exhibits an example of the
evolution of thought concerning personal identity: "in its original Latin
sense 'genius' meant 'a guardian spirit,' [but] by the sixteenth century
it had come to refer to the 'characteristic disposition or quality' of an
individual man."56 Additionally, the modern notion of a genius, which
dates back to the mid-eighteenth century, describes such a person as one
possessing "extraordinary ability."
By the mid-nineteenth century,
however, the word genius meant a person possessing "creative power"
stemming from "higher faculties of imagination, reason, and the
will." 58
A new judicial ideal emerged as judges started associating the word
genius with themselves."
Simultaneously, there emerged another
judicial ideal of "legal formalism" that was characterized "by a rigid,
deductive mode of reasoning."6 0 In essence, during legal Romanticism,
the judge was viewed as saving the legal world from chaos and providing
law for his citizens; this judge "possessed three key attributes: (1)
creative power, (2) strength of intellect, and (3) courageous indepenThe ideal Romantic judge was "robust and rugged" in
dence."'
appearance and possessed innate intellect.12 According to Judge

51. Id. at 172 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
52. Id. at 172-73.
53. Id. at 173.
54. See id. at 187.
55. Id. at 188.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 188-89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. at 192.
60. Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. at 202.
62. Id. at 205 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Parsons, complicated legal texts were made clear to the judge simply
because of his profound intelligence." Others also held judges in high
regard, as seen in eulogies that identified these judges. For example,
Chief Justice Marshall was acknowledged in antebellum eulogies as the
"'strenuous defender and expounder of the Constitution' who 'mould [ed]
Moreover, other commentators
his own genius into its elements.'"
stated that Justice Marshall "was not the [expounder of the Constitution
but] ... the author [and] the creator of it."' Ultimately, this ideal
judge possessed the ability to combine his subjective and objective view
of the world to deliver impartial yet personal written opinions."
To the present day, across lines of legal ideology, legal commentary
continues to endow judges with elevated, hero-like status. Ronald
Dworkin, in his Taking Rights Seriously," presents a Romantic hero-a
judge he calls Hercules (the most popular and widely worshipped of
Greek heroes)-whose world is liberal, apocalyptic, and intensely
communitarian."
Hercules was not an ideal judge but rather a
Romantic hero: "He is a romanticization of the reasonableness of
authority, and his world romanticizes reason itself "69 Similarly, in
Law's Empire"o Dworkin stated, "The courts are the capitals of law's
empire, and judges are its princes."n Finally, Justice Holmes described

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 204.
at 203 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
(internal quotation marks omitted)
at 226.

67.

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).

See id. at 105, 128-30. It is particularly jarring to find such Romanticism about the
judge in Dworkin, who plainly recognized at least part of the collaborative nature of
judicial writing in his famous article comparing common-law judicial opinions to chapters
68.

in a chain novel. See Marianne Sadowski, "LanguageIs Not Life": The Chain Enterprise,
Interpretive Communities, and the Dworkin/Fish Debate, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1099, 1102

(2001). In "this theory, a group of novelists convenes and agrees to write a 'chain' novel,
where they will draw random numbers and each novelist will write a chapter." Id. The
chapters are "writ[ten] sequentially, whereby one person'starts' the novel, and sends the
chapter to a subsequent author, who reads the previous chapter before authoring her own
chapter[,l ... seek[ing] to create a 'single unified' 'work of art' that is 'consistent'" in the
final product. Id. Dworkin's theory acknowledges that"lal judge deciding a case does not
'writlel on a clean slate,' but rather must synthesize relevant precedent" and reconcile
present cases with the past. Id. at 1102-03 (second alteration in original). For Stanley
Fish's arguments against Dworkin, see STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:
CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 110-19
(1989). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 246-51 (rev. ed. 1998).

69.

Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative:An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal

Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145, 210 (1985).
70.

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).

71.

Id. at 407.
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the ideal judge as a "combination of Justinian, Jesus Christ, and John
Marshall."7 2
Needless to say, comparisons of a judge to Hercules and Jesus Christ
have perpetuated the elevated and god-like status of judges. The
celebrated judge possesses "[ilmmense learning, deep culture, critical
detachment, intellectual courage, . . . unswerving disinterestedness[,]

reinforced imagination and native humility, . . .the special requisites for
the work of the Court to whose keeping is entrusted no small share of
the destiny of the nation."" A judge's impact undoubtedly is related to
the caliber of opinions he sets forth. Justice Felix Frankfurter compares
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to both a thinker and a magician, stating
that "[iun deciding cases, . . . his aim was to try to strike the jugular.
His opinions appear effortless-birds of brilliant plumage pulled from the
magician's sleeves."7 Additionally, Frankfurter describes how "Justice
Cardozo 'always spoke of Holmes as the Master,' as 'the profoundest
intellect who had ever dispensed Anglo-American justice.""'
III.

JUDICIAL OPINIONS Do NoT FUNCTION THE WAY LITERARY TEXTS
CONVENTIONALLY ARE ASSUMED To

This robust Romantic view of the judge as author-creator is, unfortunately, conveyed both explicitly and implicitly to United States law
students and thereby informs the interpretation of judicial opinions by
inexperienced legal readers far more than it should. The most obvious
way legal education romantically elevates the judge is in its dominant
focus on the judicial opinion as the subject of study. It is no exaggeration to say that judicial opinions form almost the exclusive subject of
study during the first year of law school and the vast majority of the
subjects of study during the second and third years. Any attention paid
in law school to writing other than judicial opinions-for example, writing
by legislators, government regulators, lawyers in nonlitigation contexts,
or lawyers writing to a judge in a litigation context that will culminate
in a judicial opinion-is a recent phenomenon and is still clearly
subordinate to the "case method" of teaching developed at Harvard in
the 1880s.
The problem with conveying this privilege of focus on the judge and
the judicial opinion in legal education is that beginning legal readers are
taught to believe judicial opinions are like literary texts-that their

72.
(1988).
73.
74.
75.

Robert A. Ferguson, Holmes and the Judicial Figure, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 511
Id. at 510.
Id. at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 518.
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interpretation is the same sort of exercise as the interpretation of
literary authors. As hardly needs to be repeated, Michel Foucault in
What Is an Author?," outlined how conferring "authorship" of a text on
an individual has several implications for how that text is read."
First, of course, authorship makes texts "objects of appropriation."" As
discussed above, claims that judges have some ownership interests in
their opinions have been and continue to be made despite the utter
incompatibility of these claims with legal practice.
Second, the fact that a text can be and is most conventionally
attributed to an author in and of itself makes the text a literary one. 9
Interestingly, as Foucault points out, it is with the rise of the Romantic
view of the literary author in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries
that the "authorship" of scientific texts diminished in significance so that
"[sicientific discourses began to be received for themselves, in the
anonymity of an established or always redemonstrable truth; their
membership in a systematic ensemble, and not the reference to the
individual who produced them, stood as their guarantee."o That
description of the way scientific texts are interpreted is far more
consistent with the practices of lawyers and judges outlined above than
with conventional literary interpretation. In contrast, as readers of
scientific texts discarded concern for the authorship of those texts,
"literary discourses came to be accepted only when endowed with the
author function."" It is strange, therefore, that in so much legal
commentary the author function is precisely what is emphasized.
Authorship has been conferred on some sets of texts in an effort to find
uniformity in those texts and to diminish the significance of any
discontinuities and inconsistencies they contained.82 Finally, being able
to attribute authorship to a legal idea permits argument based purely
on authority:
one defines a proposition's theoretical validity in relation to the work
of the founders [of the discipline in which the proposition is advancedl-while, in the case of Galileo and Newton, it is in relation to
what physics or cosmology is (in its intrinsic structure and "normativ-

76. MICHEL FOUCAULT, What Is an Author?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 101 (Paul
Rabinow ed., 1984).
77. Id. at 101-20.
78. Id. at 108.
79. Id. at 109-10.
80. Id. at 109.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 111.
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ity") that one affirms the validity of any proposition that those men
may have put forth.'
Following Foucault, in assuming an opinion is written by a unitary
creator, an inexperienced legal reader reads with the following unconscious premises: (1) the opinion (along with all the judge's writing) is an
organic whole within which each piece has its function as part of that
whole; (2) the opinion seeks to be a complete statement on the subject it
addresses; (3) the opinion seeks to be a final statement on the subject it
addresses; (4) the opinion's quality lies primarily in the deference
accorded its author and the authors he relies upon; (5) the opinion is
devoid of ambiguity; and (6) the judge in some way owns the opinion.
As explained above, however, almost exactly the opposite is true about
the way the legal profession's interpretive practices are actually
conducted. First, a judicial opinion is not unitary in its composition.
The opinion is a pastiche composed from a number of sources, including
parties' briefs, bench memos written by clerks, earlier opinions, other
sources of law (including statutes and regulations), commentary on the
primary law, and the judge's own thinking. Each of these sources, in
turn, is similarly composed of the same types of pieces. Efforts to
impose unity on legal texts that are almost always written in a discourse
community that views them as context-specific can lead to absurd and
even horrific results.8

83. Id. at 116.
84. A particularly egregious imposition of unity upon the interpretation of diverse legal
texts is the legal memorandum produced by the Bush Justice Department during the
George W. Bush Administration. The memorandum determined that the definition of
"torture" under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2006) was limited to treatment that causes
"severe pain," which the memorandum defined as pain that is "equivalent in intensity to
the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
function, or even death." Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee on Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2002), availableat http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzalesaug2002.pdf; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2006). The speciousness of the argument is
striking. First, the statute relied upon does not, as the memorandum implies, define
severe pain. See Bybee, supra, at 5-6 (defining severe pain by use of methods of statutory
interpretation). More importantly, for present purposes, the memorandum equated the
definition of severe pain in the statute relied upon with the definition under the various
legal authorities banning torture, thereby imposing a unity upon widely disparate texts.
Id. The authorities relied upon are part of a statutory governmental insurance program,
and to the extent they concern the definition of severe pain, they limit claims under the
program and thus further the program's solvency. See 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395w-22(d)(3XB) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e) (2000). It is patently ridiculous to find
illumination of the meaning of the term severe pain as used in a statute pertaining to
torture, in a statute pertaining to the regulation of an insurance scheme. An insurance
regulation will naturally restrict the meaning of covered terms-one of the regulation's
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Second, judicial opinions and the texts that produce them do not
possess the status of property. The absence of a proprietary interest in
legal texts feeds naturally into legal practice, the conventions of which
would be the equivalent of theft in most contexts students have
encountered. Conversely, attributing ownership to legal texts discourages such practices."
As a corollary to the absence of any ownership interest in legal texts,
experienced legal readers evaluate those texts primarily based on their
persuasive power, not on the weight of authority they bear. Few things
are more difficult to get across to the novice legal reader: law is not the
location and application of authority; rather, its principal object is
adherence to its dictates, and this adherence is obtained in our legal
culture far more importantly by normative persuasion than by reliance
on authority.
In addition, few opinions are the "final" word in any meaningful sense.
An opinion may, but often does not, dispose of an entire lawsuit, but
even if such a judgment is one of the limited class of opinions issued by
a court of last resort, it is never anything but tentative and contingent
with respect to generalizations at any higher level than the specific facts
resolved by the opinion.
Finally, a judicial opinion is directed at several different audiences,
none of which meaningfully include the law student. The opinion's
"implied readers" include the parties to the case and their lawyers,
courts up and down the appellate chain, the legislative and executive
bodies concerned with the applicable law, legal scholars and critics, the
press, and the body politic."
Squaring education with practice is not something law schools are very
good at. Inevitably, the failure to do so results in educational deficiencies. When the failure is attributable to a lack of attention to the
premises implicit in both the practice and the educational process, it is
correctable. Strangely, however, the implications of conventional notions

purposes is maintenance of the scheme's solvency. The Bush Justice Department
subsequently made the memorandum inoperative in a new memorandum that expressly
rejected "reasoning" regarding the definition of severe pain advanced in the earlier
memorandum. Memorandum from Daniel Levin on Legal Standards Applicable Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, at 10 (Dec. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.justice.gov/ok/18usc2340a2.htm.
85. In fact, the neglect to notice the conflict between academic plagiarism policies and
the collaborative nature of legal writing in practice is a difficulty regularly encountered but
rarely noted.
86. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner's
Appellate Opinions, 1981-82-Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During an
ExtraordinaryRookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 656 (2000).
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of judicial authorship are difficult to overcome. Perhaps the difficulty
lies significantly in the prominence "ownership" plays in contemporary
political discourse. Perhaps, however, it lies in further study." After
all, while lawyers do not necessarily write about the absence of an
author in judicial opinions, their practices clearly reflect an understanding of that absence.

87. At the purely empirical level, I am currently exploring ways of statistically
analyzing the similarities between briefs and the opinions issued in response to those
briefs. The purpose of this research is to support the anecdotal assertions in this Article
that judges regularly do literally cut and paste those briefs into their opinions.
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